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RECENT STANDING CASES AND A
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The standing requirement in federal court concerns whether or not
the plaintiff is a proper party to seek a judicial decision on the issues
which he presents. In making this determination, the Supreme Court has
articulated several distinct elements of standing. For example, the Court
has demanded that the plaintiff have a sufficient interest in the outcome
of the controversy to assure an adverse presentation of the issues.' In
addition, the Court has construed article I, section 2 to limit the
judicial power to situations which give rise to a case or controversy.2
Such a situation is usually said to exist when the plaintiff has sustained
an injury or is in immediate danger of sustaining one.'
The nebulous concept of standing has resisted clarification through
any exact rules, and attempts at precision have created a confusing 4
range of holdings. 5 A comparison of different holdings often reveals
seemingly illogical and inconsistent results, many of which seem unjust,
as well. For example, a citizen is allowed to challenge government action
which might remotely affect his environmental and aesthetic interests,6
yet he is prevented from contesting violation of a constitutional provi-
1. E.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204 (1962).
2. Nashville, C. & St. L Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
3. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972); Association of
Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970); Ex parte
L&vitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
4. "Standing has been called one of the most amorphous concepts in the entire
domain of the public law ....
"The law of standing as developed by the Supreme Court has become an area of
incredible complexity. Much that the Court has written appears to have been designed
to supply retrospective satisfaction rather than future guidance. The Court has itself
characterized its law of standing as 'a complicated specialty of federal jurisdiction."'
Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (citations
omitted).
5. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208
(1974), rev'g Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C.
1971); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
6. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
[213]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
sion designed to protect him from legislators passing laws for their own
economic gain.7
The Supreme Court faced these problems in two recent cases,
United States v. Richardson8 and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War.9 In both, the Court attempted to resolve uncertainties by
limiting the circumstances under which standing would be allowed. The
plaintiff in each case was said to lack standing as a citizen to challenge
government action unless he had suffered a concrete and tangible injury.
The Court also narrowly construed the rule under which a citizen could
sue based on his interest as a taxpayer.
Such a narrow view of standing raises one major problem. The
requirement of a concrete injury ignores the fact that some statutes and
constitutional provisions are designed specifically to protect against
intangible harm. Moreover, the recent cases fail to delineate consistent
standing requirements beyond the necessity of some type of injury.
This note will analyze the development of the law of citizen and
taxpayer standing through Richardson and Reservists and suggest al-
ternative standing guidelines which could help resolve these remaining
problems.
Citizen Standing
The Requirement of an Injury
Citizen standing has customarily centered on the case or controver-
sy requirement. This aspect of standing is fulfilled if the plaintiff has
been injured in fact.1" The constitutional requirement of an injury is
usually deemed to necessitate a "direct" injury as opposed to one that is
only "abstract" or "speculative." In Ex parte Livitt' the plaintiff chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the appointment and confirmation of a
Supreme Court justice who had been a senator when a statute was
passed which increased retirement benefits to members of the Court.
The appointment was contested as a violation of the ineligibility clause
of article I, section 6, clause 2, which provides that a senator or
representative cannot be appointed to a civil office for which a salary
increase was determined while he served in the legislature. The Court
held that the plaintiff did not have standing because he could show
neither a direct injury nor an immediate threat of such an injury.
7. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937). For a discussion of this case see text
accompanying note 11 infra.
8. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
9. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
10. See cases cited note 3 supra.
11. 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
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The result in United States v. SCRAP 12 in which a tenuous injury
was held sufficient for standing provides a clear contrast to the require-
ment of a direct injury as expressed in Levitt. In SCRAP, five law
students challenged the failure of the Interstate Commerce Commission
to suspend a temporary railroad surcharge on most freight rates. The
plaintiffs alleged that the surcharge violated the part of the National
Environmental Policy Act 3 which requires that an environmental im-
pact statement be made on every federal action that may affect the
quality of the environment."4 The students complained of the possibility
of harm to their recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests, claiming
that the surcharge could have an adverse effect on their Washington
environment. The majority opinion traced the plaintiffs' argument as
follows:
[A] general rate increase would allegedly cause increased use of
nonrecyclable commodities as compared to recyclable goods, thus
resulting in the need to use more natural resources to produce such
goods, some of which resources might be taken from the Washing-
ton area, and resulting in more refuse that might be discarded in
national parks in the Washington area. .... 15
Although the injury alleged was obviously indirect and speculative, the
Court held that it met the standing requirement.
In recent cases, the Court has indicated that a case or controversy
can be found when the rights created by a statute are violated even
though there would be no injury without the statute." This rule greatly
broadens the scope of possibilities for judicially cognizable injuries, as it
allows Congress to determine which injuries will meet the case or
controversy requirement. For example, if Congress made it unlawful to
open an umbrella in a dwelling place, an owner of a house in which
infractions of the statute occurred would have standing to enforce it,
even though his only "injury" would be to his right to be free from open
umbrellas in his house.
Although the Court has deemed an increasingly wide range of
injuries sufficient to confer standing, a plaintiff has not been allowed to
bring an action to benefit the public unless he asserted actual injury to
himself. A mere interest in the subject matter of the litigation has been
inadequate. In Sierra Club v. Morton'7 the Sierra Club sought to block a
proposed development of part of the Sequoia National Forest, alleging
12. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(i) (1970).
15. 412 US. at 688.
16. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 n.2 (1974); Linda R.S. v.
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972) (White, J., concurring).
17. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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violation of federal laws for the preservation of national parks and
forests. In view of its special expertise and concern in the area of
conservation, the group sought to represent the aesthetic and environ-
mental interests of the public. The Court pointed out that injuries in fact
could include injuries to the plaintiff's environmental and aesthetic
interests,' but that whatever the injury, it must be sustained by the
plaintiff and a sincere interest in the litigation could not substitute for
such injury.' 9 Since the Sierra Club had not alleged that any of its
members would be affected by the proposed development, standing was
denied.
Rules of Self Restraint
In addition to the general constitutional requirement of an injury,
the Court has limited citizen standing by excluding some cases which
nonetheless meet the case or controversy requirement. The criteria for
these limitations are known as rules of self restraint because they enable
the courts to disallow constitutionally permissible suits.2"
Prior to recent trends, the most important rule of self restraint in
citizen standing was the requirement that plaintiff assert a legal right.2
In order to have standing plaintiff had to assert a right either recognized
at common law or created by a statute. For example, in Tennessee
Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority22 eighteen corpora-
tions sought to enjoin the allegedly unconstitutional activities of the
TVA. Although the plaintiffs were injured by competition from the
TVA, the Court denied standing, holding that one injured by govern-
ment action could not challenge that action unless "the right invaded is a
legal right--one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected
18. Id. at 738-39.
19. Id.
20. One such rule of self restraint is mentioned in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249 (1953). This case began with a state court damage suit for breach of a racially
restrictive covenant. The defendant in the contract action challenged enforcement of
the restrictive covenant as a violation of the fourteenth amendment rights of non-Cauca-
sions, whom the covenant purported to exclude from the area. Although the defendant
would have been injured by having to pay damages for breach, he would normally have
been prevented from asserting the constitutional claim by the rule that was generally
applicable in such situations: a litigant cannot claim standing to assert the constitu-
tional rights of some third party. However, the Court chose not to follow this general
rule because the unique factual situation might prevent the third party from ever being
able to bring the suit in his own behalf. Thus, such general rules of self restraint are
not binding on the Court.
21. See, e.g., Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940); The Chicago
Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924); Comment, The Congressional Intent to Protect
Test: A Judicial Lowering of the Standing Barrier, U, COLO. L. REv. 96, 99-103
(1969).
22. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
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against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a
privilege. ' 23
In Federal Communications Commission v. Sanders Brothers Ra-
dio Station2 4 the legal right doctrine was bypassed to some extent. In
this case the Court allowed standing on the basis of a statute, but the
statute did not create a legal right in the sense of "[conferring] a
privilege" as expressed in Tennessee Electric.2 5 Rather, the Court decid-
ed that the statute manifested a congressional intent to allow standing
even without infringement of a legal right. The issue in Sanders con-
cerned whether an existing radio station could challenge the FCC's
grant of a broadcasting license to a new rival station. The statute
involved was the Communications Act of 1934, which provided that any
person "aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected" by FCC
action was entitled to judicial review." Plaintiff's alleged injury, the loss
of business resulting from increased competition, was not an interest
protected by a legal right. In recognizing standing, the Court reasoned
that Congress:
may have been of the opinion that one likely to be financially
injured by the issue of a license would be the only person having
a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate court
errors of law in the action of the Commission in granting the
license.2 7
Analogous interpretations of similar statutes have resulted in a
significant lowering of the citizen standing barrier.2 ' The Administrative
Procedure Act29 has been the basis for standing in numerous suits. °
This statute provides: "A person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof."'"
In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp,2 a suit brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, the
23. Id. at 137-38 (footnote omitted).
24. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
25. 306 U.S. at 137.
26. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (6) (1970).
27. 309 U.S. at 477.
28. See, e.g., Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968) (competitor
granted standing to challenge TVA power sales in violation of statutory restrictions).
29. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59,
701-06 (1970 & Supp. IM 1973) ).
30. E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
32. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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Court announced a test which has been widely used33 to determine
standing. The plaintiff, a seller of computer services, challenged a ruling
of the Comptroller of the Currency which had allowed national banks to
provide data processing services to their customers. The plaintiff alleged
that this ruling violated the portion of the Bank Service Corporation Act
of 1962 which provides that corporations covered by the statute can
engage in no activities other than providing financial services for
banks.3 4 The Court developed a two part test for standing. First, the
plaintiff must allege that the challenged administrative action has caused
him injury in fact, thereby fulfilling the case or controversy require-
ment. 15 Second, the interest for which the plaintiff seeks protection must
be "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."36 In this case the
first part of the test was satisfied because the challenged ruling would
create competition for the plaintiff, causing him economic injury. The
Court decided that the second requirement was also met as the plaintiff's
interest in being free from illegal competition was arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected by the Bank Service Corporation Act.
Data Processing emphasizes that any injury in fact will satisfy the first
part of the test37 and thus also the constitutional requirement of a case
or controversy. The Court's use of the word "arguably" suggests that
the second part of the test is very flexible.
Thus, largely by concluding that certain statutes show congression-
al intent to allow standing, the courts have permitted suits involving
injuries to an increasing range of interests. As in the case of the APA,
these statutes are commonly ones which allow challenges to administra-
tive or other government action. Even if the statute does not mention the
specific injury claimed by the plaintiff, the Court often allows the suit,
reasoning that Congress has manifested an intent that someone be
allowed to sue in the particular area treated by the statute, no matter
what the injury.
Taxpayer Standing
One particular area of citizen standing that is usually considered
separately is taxpayer standing. A citizen who asserts only the interest of
a taxpayer funding the government has generally been held to lack
standing.3" This conclusion has prevailed even when the specific govern-
33. See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Letter Car-
riers v. Independent Postal Sys. of America, 470 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1972).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 1864 (1970).
35. 397 U.S. at 152.
36. Id. at 153.
37. Id. at 154.
38. E.g., Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258
U.S. 126 (1922).
[Vol. 27
RECENT STANDING CASES
ment action that is challenged would clearly result in an expenditure of
some small portion of the plaintiffs tax dollars. 9
The Supreme Court seems first to have considered the question of
taxpayer standing in Wilson v. Shaw.40 The plaintiffs, based on their
interests as property taxpayers, sought an injunction against expenditure
of funds for the Panama Canal on the grounds that the United States did
not have clear title to the land. While deciding against the plaintiff on
other grounds, the Court treated with skepticism the idea that a taxpayer
should be able to bring the suit. The Court stated that to decide the case
on behalf of such a plaintiff "would be an exercise of judicial power
which, to say the least, is novel and extraordinary." 41
In Frothingham v. Mellon42 the Court set forth the general rule
that if the plaintiff's only interest is that of a taxpayer, a suit to challenge
the constitutionality of a federal statute will not be allowed. The plaintiff
in Frothingham complained that a federal aid program designed to
reduce infant mortality violated the fifth and tenth amendments. She
alleged that the statute was an attempt by Congress to usurp powers
reserved to the states and that her increased tax burden in financing the
program would be a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Thus, the harm that she claimed was the economic injury caused by an
increased tax. The Court in Frothingham said that such a statute cannot
be challenged unless a plaintiff is able to show that he "has sustained or
is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of
its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in
common with people generally. '43 The Court decided that revenue
needed to finance the program would affect taxation in only a "remote,
fluctuating and uncertain" manner.4 4 The plaintiff's insignificant share
in such an uncertain burden did not provide the injury necessary for
standing.
The rule of Frothingham remained a barrier to taxpayer standing
until the decision in Flast v. Cohen.45 In Flast taxpayers challenged the
constitutionality of a statute which provided federal funds to religious
schools.40 The plaintiffs contended that the statute violated the establish-
ment and free exercise clauses of the First Amendment.4 7 The Court
39. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
40. 204 U.S. 24 (1907).
41. Id. at 31.
42. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
43. Id. at 488.
44. Id. at 487.
45. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
46. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, tit. I, 1 (codified in
scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
47. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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explained that taxpayers who challenge statutes through their status as
taxpayers must generally be denied standing because they lack a neces-
sary "personal stake" in the outcome48 and are therefore unable to meet
the case or controversy requirement. The Court proceeded to develop a
test designed to identify this "necessary stake" so that where it was
found standing could be allowed.49 Taxpayer standing exists, according
to Flast, where the following two part test can be satisfied:
First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between [his]
status and the type of legislative enactment attacked. . . . Sec-
ondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and
the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. 50
The Court indicated that the first part of the test would be satisfied if
the taxpayer contested the constitutionality of an exercise of congres-
sional power under the taxing and spending clause of article I, section
8.51 In contrast, a challenge to legislative action which was essentially
regulatory and involved only "an incidental expenditure of tax funds"52
would be insufficient. The second requirement would be met if the
taxpayer were able to show that the challenged enactment violated a
specific constitutional limitation of the taxing and spending power.
53
In Flast the Court found that the statute involved was an exercise of
the taxing and spending power and that the establishment clause was a
specific limitation of that power; thus, standing was recognized. The
Court determined that the establishment clause qualified as a specific
limitation on the taxing and spending power because the Court deter-
mined that the purpose of the clause was to prevent spending to support
religion or to favor any religion.
Frothingham was distinguished on the basis that the plaintiff there
had failed to satisfy the second part of the test.54 Although she attacked
an exercise of the taxing and spending power, the constitutional provi-
sions which she alleged to have been violated were not deemed to be
specific limitations on that power. Her tenth amendment claim was
considered to be merely an allegation that Congress had exceeded the
general powers given it by article I, section 8. Her fifth amendment
claim also failed to confer standing as the Court found that the fifth
amendment was not designed to protect taxpayers against increased tax
liability.
Although the Supreme Court did not again apply the Flast rule to
48. 392 U.S. at 101.
49. Id. at 102.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 103.
52. Id. at 102.
53. Id. at 103-04.
54. Id. at 105.
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taxpayers until 1974,11 the lower courts have often considered the
problem. In Richardson v. Kennedy5" a taxpayer challenged the Postal
Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 196757 which provided for congres-
sional pay raises. The statute authorized the president to recommend
salaries which would become effective unless Congress chose to modify
them. The plaintiff contended that this procedure violated article I,
section 6, clause 1 of the Constitution which provides that "[tihe
Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their
Services, to be ascertained by Law. . . ... The plaintiff argued that "by
Law" referred only to legislation which itself fixed the salary. Finding
that the Flast test was not satisfied, the Court denied standing. The
appropriation sought to be enjoined, the Court reasoned, arose not
under the taxing and spending power but rather under article I, section
6, since the latter provision would give Congressmen the right to re-
ceive a salary even without a taxing and spending power. Furthermore,
article I, section 6 was found not be be the necessary specific limitation.
The Court pointed out that the Flast holding was carefully limited to
establishment clause violations and that article I, section 6 "unlike the
Establishment clause. . . does not secure fundamental rights in which
all taxpayers and citizens have an equal, direct, and personal stake."58
Many lower court decisions regarding taxpayer standing deal with
challenges to the constitutionality of the Vietnam War.59 In Velvel v.
Nixon 0 a professor of constitutional law sought a declaratory judgment
that the Vietnam War was unconstitutional. The Court denied taxpayer
standing, stating that the challenged expenditures for the war resulted
from the congressional powers to raise and support armies and to
provide and maintain the Navy, not from the taxing and spending power
as required by Flast. In Atlee v. Laird1 the plaintiff contested the
Vietnam conflict on the grounds that it violated article I, section 8,
clause 11. This clause gives Congress the power to declare war, and
55. In the period between the Flast decision and the Richardson and Reservists
cases the Supreme Court did not directly apply the Flast rule to determine whether or
not a taxpayer had standing. Flast has often been cited, however, to support certain
general principles of standing. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974)
(standing involves the case or controversy requirement); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 617 (1973) (there must be some threatened or actual injury); Socialist Labor
Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 586-87 (1972) (plaintiff must have a personal stake
in the outcome).
56. 313 F. Supp. 1282 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
57. 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-61 (1970).
58. 313 F. Supp. at 1286.
59. Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042
(1970); Atlee v. Laird, 339 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1972); United States v. Sisson,
294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968).
60. 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970).
61. 339 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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plaintiff argued that a war was being carried on without a congressional
declaration. Again, the Flast test was not met and taxpayer standing was
denied,6" as the constitutional provision was deemed not to be a specific
limitation on spending.
The foregoing cases illustrate that the Flast rule has been given a
very narrow interpretation. Taxpayer standing has been granted only
when a spending measure has been attacked as a violation of the
establishment clause. Thus, the general rule of Frothingham, that tax-
payer interest alone cannot create a sufficient injury for standing, re-
mains, for the most part, unchanged.
The Setting for Richardson and Reservists
Prior to the 1974 Supreme Court decisions in United States v.
Richardson63 and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War,6 4 the law of standing had been changing rapidly. Taxpayer stand-
ing had been allowed for the first time in the 1968 Flast case, and
although the rule in Flast had been narrowly construed, it had at least
established the possibility of standing based solely on taxpayer status. In
addition, the scope of judicially congnizable injuries had greatly in-
creased in other areas of citizen standing, largely through cases which
held that certain statutes demonstrated congressional intent to allow
standing. The lowering of the barriers to standing lead the district court
in Reservists to say, "In recent years the Supreme Court has greatly
expanded the concept of standing and in this Circuit the concept has
now been almost completely abandoned."6 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court opinions in Richardson and Reservists make it clear that a majori-
ty of the Court continue to view standing as a significant barrier tc
access to the federal courts.
United States v. Richardson
The Richardson case arose when the plaintiff, a citizen and taxpa.
er in Pennsylvania, wrote to the Treasury Department inquiring aboi
the annual expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency. He w;
informed that the Treasury Department did not receive informatic
regarding the CIA because Congress, by passing the Central Intelligen
Agency Act of 1949,66 had determined that such information should n
62. Standing was granted, however, on other grounds.
63. 418 U.S. 166 (1974), rev'g 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972).
64. 418 U.S. 208 (1974), rev'g Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird,
F. Supp. 833 (D.D.C. 1971).
65. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833, 839 (D.]
1971).
66. 50 U.S.C. § 403a-j (1970).
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be made public. This act permits the transfer of funds between the CIA
and other agencies "without regard to any provisions of law limiting or
prohibiting transfers between appropriations."6 7 The only accounting
for these funds is a certificate given by the director of the CIA which is
not made available to the public. Thus, the only information that
Richardson could obtain regarding the expenditures of the CIA was that
some of the money the CIA spent had originally been appropriated to
other agencies. Richardson brought suit complaining that the CIA act
violated article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution. This clause
provides that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement
and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall
be published from time to time."
The district court granted a motion for dismissal on the ground
that the plaintiff lacked standing. The court of appeals reversed, 68
deciding that Richardson had standing as a taxpayer under Flast. The
court broadly interpreted the Flast rule, emphasizing the reasoning
behind the rule rather than the limited factual situation which the Flast
Court had indicated would fit within its holding. The first part of the
Flast test, as noted above, requires that the taxpayer challenge a govern-
ment appropriation under the taxing and spending power, as that basis
would establish a sufficient nexus between his status and the challenged
government activity. The court of appeals held, however, that whether
or not a direct appropriation was challenged, the first part of the Flast
test was met if there existed a nexus between the taxpayer plaintiff and
the challenged government activity. The court said:
The Government argues that Flast must be limited to challenges
to appropriations. That view attempts to confine the case to its
facts without regard to its reasoning. Flast is concerned with
adverseness and specificity of issues for 'standing,' not spending per
se.
6 9
The court decided that there was a sufficient nexus between the lack of
reporting of expenditures and the plaintiffs status as a taxpayer to give
the plaintiff a personal stake in the outcome and thus fulfill this inter-
pretation of the first part of the Flast rule. The second part of the Flast
rule was also found to be satisfied, as the court decided that the
requirement that the government account to the public for expenditures
was a specific limitation on the spending power. 70
The court also used the first part of the Data Processing test to find
a personal stake in the outcome for the plaintiff Richardson, relying on
67. Id. § 403f(a).
68. 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972).
69. Id. at 852 (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 853-54.
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that case for the principle that any injury in fact could provide the
personal stake. 71 Injury was found in the plaintiff's inability to know
how his tax money was being spent.
In a majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals's decision and denied standing. The Court
emphasized the narrowness of the Flast rule, reiterating the idea that the
rule is satisfied only when the plaintiff challenges a spending measure
and alleges violation of a specific constitutional limitation on the taxing
and spending power. 72 The Court decided that neither aspect of the test
was met, as Richardson was challenging a statute regulating the CIA
rather than a provision for spending. Furthermore, the Court found, the
constitutional provision in question was designed not to limit spending,
but simply to allow citizens to learn how money is being spent.
After a brief disposition of the particular claim of taxpayer stand-
ing, the opinion turned to a discussion of the type of injury that is
necessary for standing in any situation. The Chief Justice concluded
that a plaintiff never has standing unless he can show that " 'he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury.
S..,73 Furthermore, this injury must be a "particular concrete in-
jury' 71 and not a "mere 'interest in a problem' "5 or part of "'general-
ized grievances about the conduct of government.' "76 Richardson's
complaint was deemed to be of the "general grievance" variety.
77
71. Id. at 853.
72. 418 U.S. 166, 173 (1974).
73. Id. at 177-78, quoting Ex parte Idvitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
74. 418 U.S. at 177.
75. Id., quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
76. 418 U.S. at 175, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
77. In a concurring opinion Justice Powell reiterated much of the second part of
the majority opinion, emphasizing the necessity of an injury for standing. Justice Pow-
ell stated that when no statute exists which grants a right of review, "a plaintiff must
allege some particularized injury that sets him apart from the man on the street." 418
U.S. at 194 (citation omitted). Justice Powell also argued that the Flast test for stand-
ing should be abolished and that the Court should return to pre-Flast criteria. Id. at
184-85. He indicated that it is necessary to maintain the traditional standing barriers
if the Court is to 'keep its proper function in government. Id. at 188. He argued that
to allow unlimited standing would give the Court general supervisory powers over Con-
gress, which would be contrary to our democratic system. He further explained that
increased standing would dilute judicial resources and cause the public to be less accept-
ing of the Court in its proper role.
Justice Brennan, in one dissent applicable to both Richardson and Reservists, stated
that the only consideration for standing should be whether or not the plaintiff has made
a "good-faith allegation that 'the challenged action has caused him injury in fact.'"
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 235 (1974), quoting
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167-68 (1970). Justice Brennan concluded that Rich-
ardson had alleged sufficient injury in the detriment to his right as a voter to receive
information that would aid ballot decisions. Justice Brennan also indicated that he be-
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Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War
In the Reservists case the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the
incompatibility clause of the Constitution prevented members of Con-
gress from also being officers of the armed forces reserves. This provi-
sion states that "no Person holding any Office under the United States,
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office. 78
The plaintiffs claimed standing as reservists, as persons opposed to the
Vietnam War, as taxpayers, and as citizens.
The district court denied standing on the first three of these
grounds. In applying a test similar to that in Data Processing, the court
rejected standing based on reservist status because it was unlikely that
plaintiffs' interests merely as reservists were designed to be protected by
the incompatibility clause.79 The court felt that plaintiffs' opposition to
the war had no bearing on standing."' Standing as taxpayers was
similarly rejected because the constitutional provision in question was
not a limitation on spending, and thus failed to meet the Flast test.
81
Nonetheless, through use of a test derived from Data
Processing, the district court did allow standing based on each plain-
tiff's interest as a citizen. The first step of this test requires an allega-
tion of an injury in fact. The court pointed out that the injury which
might result to plaintiffs from Congressmen being in the reserves was
hypothetical. It was deemed to be a sufficient injury for standing, how-
ever, because the hypothetical nature of the injury "underlies the con-
stitutional provision itself;"182 that is, the incompatibility clause ad-
dresses itself "to the potential for undue influence rather than to its
realization. 8 3 Turning to the second part of the test, the court decided
that the plaintiffs' concerns as citizens were within the zone of interests
to be protected by the incompatibility clause because the sole purpose
of the clause was to protect citizens' interests in having legislators free
from conflicts of interest.8 4
lieves the Flast rule is of value only when a taxpayer challenges violations of the estab-
lishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment. Id. at 238.
Two other dissenting opinions were written in Richardson. Justice Douglas used
a broad interpretation of the Flast rule and found taxpayer standing. 418 U.s. at 197.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Marshall, developed a rule which allows standing when
the plaintiff seeks performance of an affirmative duty owed to him by the government.
Id. at 202. The duty to provide Richardson with a statement of expenditures was found
to fit this rule.
78. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
79. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War v. Laird, 323 F. Supp. 833, 840 (D.D.C.
1971).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 841.
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The district court offered several additional reasons why citizen
standing should be granted. The plaintiffs were not seeking to "'...
air generalized grievances about the conduct of government,' ,s the
court felt, but were seeking enforcement of a "'precise self-operative
provision of the Constitution.' "86 Moreover, the litigants were clearly
adversaries . 7 Finally, if the plaintiffs did not have standing then no one
would, and the problem would go unchallenged.88
The court of appeals affirmed the district court without writing an
opinion, but the Supreme Court reversed, with Chief Justice Burger
again writing for the majority.89 The Court addressed only two of the
grounds originally asserted by the plaintiffs, citizen standing and taxpay-
er standing. The claim of taxpayer standing was summarily dismissed as
the Court emphasized that the Flast rule applies only in situations in
which spending is challenged. 0
The Court dealt most thoroughly with citizen standing. The opin-
ion explained that the standing requirement is a blend of the constitu-
tional necessity of a case or controversy and the more uncertain area of
policy considerations.9' A case or controversy arises when a plaintiff has
suffered an injury. Chief Justice Burger emphasized that no matter how
much the standing barrier has been lowered by the expansion of the
category of judicially cognizable injuries, the necessity of a concrete
injury remains as a constitutional imperative. 92 Moreover, the require-
ment of an injury is advantageous to the Court, according to the Chief
Justice,9" as it allows the Court to base its decision on a specific factual
situation and to avoid speculating as to future conditions. The require-
ment of an injury also enables the Court to frame relief no more broadly
than necessary, thus comporting with a generally recognized principle of
constitutional law.
The Court decided that the injury claimed by the plaintiffs as
citizens (the possibility of an unfaithful discharge of duties by members
of Congress) did not meet the requirement of a concrete injury. The
harm to the plaintiffs was determined to be a speculative and abstract
injury which concerned only the "generalized interest of all citizens in
constitutional governance. '94
The majority opinion rejected all of the district court's arguments.
85. Id. at 840-41, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
86. 323 F. Supp. at 840.
87. Id. at 841.
88. Id.
89. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
90. Id. at 228.
91. Id. at 218.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 220-21.
94. Id. at 217.
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First, the Court pointed out the inapplicability of the Data Processing
test. 5 That test was said to apply only in suits brought under the
Administrative Procedure Act. Further, the Court argued that even if
that test were appropriate, the portion of it that requires an injury in fact
was not met because there had not been a concrete injury. The Court
agreed with the district court that the injury in question was hypothetical
but held the simple fact that a hypothetical injury might be the type of
harm contemplated by a constitutional provision to be an insufficient
substitute for a concrete injury.98
The fact that plaintiffs alleged a violation of a "precise and self
operative provision" did not create a judicially cognizable injury.9 7 As to
the district court's argument that the parties were adverse, the Court
stated that "motivation is not a substitute for the actual injury needed
.... *"I8 Chief Justice Burger concluded that since no one had the
requisite injury to confer standing, the problem was not a proper one for
the judiciary and should be resolved by other branches of the govern-
ment.09
The Law of Standing in Light of Richardson and Reservists
The opinions in Richardson and Reservists make it clear that a
majority of the Court favors a very narrow interpretation of the Flast
rule. Apparently, standing as a taxpayer exists almost exclusively within
the factual situation present in Flast. Other areas of citizen standing are
more unsettled. The justices do seem to agree that the plaintiff must
allege an injury or the possibility of a future injury; the type of injury
required is variously described as concrete, direct, and palpable. The
widespread confusion which remains despite these descriptions stems
95. Id. at 227 n.16.
96. Id. at 224.
97. Id. at 225.
98. Id. at 226.
99. Id. at 227.
Four other opinions were written in Reservists. Justice Stewart concurred in the
denial of standing because the plaintiffs had not suffered a "direct, palpable" injury. Id.
at 228-29. The rule he developed in Richardson was not applicable. Justice Douglas
dissented, as he would have granted the plaintiffs standing as both taxpayers and citi-
zens. Id. at 229. Justice Douglas determined that the plaintiffs had standing as tax-
payers because taxpayers should be able to enforce the incompatibility clause in order
to prevent executive influence over the legislature. He found that they had standing
as citizens because the constitutional provision in question was of such importance that
each citizen had a personal stake in enforcing it. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, found
sufficient injury for citizen standing. Id. at 238. He described the interest that had
been injured as the interest in exercising the first amendment right to persuade Con-
gressmen to end the war. Justice Brennan also dissented as he found sufficient injury
to allow taxpayer standing.
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chiefly from the impossibility of determining whether or not a particular
injury fits one of these descriptions.
The problem of determining what injuries will be deemed concrete
is particularly apparent when Richardson and Reservists are compared
with SCRAP,1'0 in which speculative harm to aesthetic and environmen-
tal interests was considered a sufficient injury in fact. In Justice Mar-
shall's dissent in Reservists he expressed concern about the different
results reached in these cases, stating that it is "a sad commentary on our
priorities"''1 that the federal court will hear a claim involving interfer-
ence with aesthetic appreciation of natural resources, but not one involv-
ing violation of a specific constitutional provision.'02
The majorities in Richardson and Reservists, by emphasizing the
necessity of specific and tangible harm, direct that a largely speculative
injury provides an insufficient basis for standing. This demand for
concreteness suggests a break in the trend toward more relaxed standing
requirements which had been indicated by such cases as SCRAP and
Data Processing.
Since the majority in Reservists decided that there was not a
sufficient injury for standing, there was no discussion of any require-
ments for standing beyond the necessity of an injury. However, it is clear
that the principles developed in this area through earlier cases remain in
effect. That is, even if the injury is deemed sufficiently concrete, stand-
ing will be denied unless the injury is to a legal right or to some interest
that Congress has intended to protect.
The Effect of the Present Standing Rules
and a Possible Alternative
The Requirement of an Injury
What is the effect of a stringent "concreteness" requirement in the
law of standing? The practical effect of deciding that plaintiffs' injuries
were too remote and uncertain in Reservists was that no one was able to
bring suit on the matter. As a result, Congressmen were allowed to
continue unchallenged a practice which possibly violates a constitutional
provision aimed at regulating their activities. In situations in which no
one has standing, Justice Burger suggests alternative remedies, such as
100. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
101. 418 U.S. at 239.
102. Id. at 239-40.
A possible explanation of the inconsistency in these two cases is that in SCRAP
the suit was brought under the Administrative Procedure Act. It may be argued that
when a suit is brought under that statute, an injury need be less direct and palpable
because through the statute, Congress has shown an intention that citizens should be
able to challenge administrative action.
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voting for different Congressmen, °" but this process would be a time
consuming and ineffective remedy to use in attempting to end a practice
shared by many Congressmen. In short, denial of standing prevents
anyone from determining whether or not Congressmen are performing
their constitutional duties and results in a constitutional provision with
little or no force.
Aside from this undesirable practical effect, a rule requiring a
concrete injury is illogical and inappropriate when applied to a constitu-
tional provision which, like the one at issue in Reservists, is designed to
protect against injuries that are not necessarily concrete. Specifically, the
incompatibility clause in Reservists is aimed at eliminating the possible
ill effects on the legislature of conflicts of interest in Congressmen and
protecting citizens from having to be concerned about such possible
effects. Thus, if the plaintiffs in this case are concerned that Congress-
men may fail to discharge their duties faithfully because of conflicts of
interest, then the plaintiffs are suffering the injury against which the
incompatibility clause is designed to protect. The injury is indeed specu-
lative, but to deny standing on that ground is to disregard the meaning
and purpose of the constitutional provision in question.
By the same reasoning, the result in SCRAP, allowing standing for
a remote and speculative injury, seems sensible because the speculative
injury was of the type contemplated by the statute alleged to be violated.
The statute required an environmental impact report;'0 4 thus, the pur-
pose of the legislation was to protect against possible future harm to the
environment. If the Court had denied standing on the ground that the
plaintiffs only harm was concern over such possible ill effects on the
environment, it would have defeated the goal of the statute.
Therefore, the question of whether an injury is sufficient for stand-
ing should not always stop with the determination of whether or not the
injury is direct or palpable or concrete. When the harm claimed is more
uncertain or intangible, it should be viewed in terms of the statute or
constitutional provision alleged to be violated. The injury should be
deemed sufficient for standing, even though speculative or indirect or
intangible, if the statute or constitutional provision in question antici-
pates such an injury and seeks to protect against it.105
103. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
104. See notes 13-14 & accompanying text supra.
105. A similar idea was posited by the district court in Reservists. See text ac-
companying note 82 supra. The plaintiffs' injury was held to be sufficient for standing
despite the fact that any harm was hypothetical because the court found that the plain-
tiffs' complaint embodied precisely the type of harm designed to be prevented by the
constitutional provision in question. The provision was designed to prevent a conflict
of interests and to free citizens from concern about the possible effects of such a con-
flict, whether or not the conflict would necessarily result in more tangible harm.
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In deciding whether a nonconcrete injury will meet such a test, a
court should be required to examine carefully the statute or constitution-
al provision in question to determine the legislators' or framers' intent as
to the type of injury anticipated. The court should proceed cautiously, as
extension of standing to other than concrete injuries should be limited to
interests that authors of the provisions actually intended to protect. This
procedure may be somewhat cumbersome, but it seems preferable to
ignoring such injuries and letting the rights involved to go unprotected.
In sum, two types of injury should satisfy the case or controversy
requirement: injuries that are tangible and direct or concrete, and
injuries that, even if not concrete, are of the type contemplated by a
statute or constitutional provision alleged to be violated.
Necessity of Standing Rules
Beyond an Injury Requirement
If the requirement of an injury is met, should anything more be
necessary before standing is allowed? Even without a standing require-
ment beyond the necessity of an injury, many cases that are currently
rejected on additional standing grounds could be rejected for reasons not
concerned with standing.1 " For example, if the Court in Richardson
had found sufficient injury for standing, and had ended the standing
inquiry at that point, the case might still have been dropped on the
ground that it raised a political question. There are cases, however,
especially in the area of injury to business interests, in which the plaintiff
has been injured sufficiently to satisfy the case or controversy require-
ment and no other factors of justiciability would exclude the suit, yet
standing should be denied because the plaintiff is an improper party.
Suppose, for example, a statute forbids the showing of pornographic
movies. Plaintiff owns a theater and shows only family movies. A new
theater opens two blocks away and shows pornographic movies in
violation of the statute. Plaintiff loses business because everyone in
town goes to the new theater. In fact, plaintiff himself goes to the new
show and enjoys it without any moral objections. Plaintiff should not
be a proper party to bring suit against the new theater because one
who is injured should not be able to bring suit when his only injury
is to an interest not intended to be protected by the violated statute.
Although plaintiff has suffered a concrete economic injury, the statute
is designed to protect against what might be termed a moral injury.
It would seem especially inappropriate to allow plaintiff to sue when
106. Justice Brennan has argued that whether or not there has been a good faith
allegation of injury should be the only consideration for standing. He has asserted that
other aspects of justiciability would serve to screen objectionable cases in which a plain-
tiff has alleged an injury. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S.
208, 235-36 (1974).
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no one is morally offended by the new theater and the people whom
the statute was designed to protect enjoy its violation.
This anomalous situation will not arise if the plaintiff has suffered
a nonconcrete injury which is nonetheless anticipated by the provision in
question. If the procedure suggested above is followed, this type of
injury would provide standing only if, after careful analysis, it were
determined that the legislators or framers intended to protect against it.
Thus, only a concrete injury, as in the example above, could meet the
case or controversy requirement and yet perhaps be inappropriate as a
basis for standing because it is not within the interests to be protected by
the violated provision.
The problem of the concrete injury which nonetheless should not
provide standing can be remedied by use of the second part of the Data
Processing standing test.10 7 This portion requires that the interest sought
to be protected be arguably within the zone of interests to be protected
or regulated by the statute or constitutional provision that is violated.
This rule would prevent the plaintiff in the hypothetical from suing
because an antipornography statute would not generally be designed to
protect or regulate a competitive or economic interest.
This "arguably within the zone of interests" test must be distin-
guished from the suggested test for a sufficient nonconcrete injury. The
suggested test, it will be recalled, asks whether or not the injury is
anticipated by the statute or constitutional provision. The difference
between the two tests is that the "arguably within the zone of interests"
requirement should be interpreted broadly, with an emphasis on the
word "arguably." Once the plaintiff has alleged a concrete injury he
need not show conclusively that it was intended to be protected against
by the violated statute or provision, rather he need only make a plausible
argument on the point. In contrast, this showing of intent should be
required before a nonconcrete injury is considered to be anticipated by a
provision. The requirement of only a plausible argument concerning
intent is appropriate in the case of a concrete injury because the plaintiff
must have suffered an obvious injury even before this consideration, and
a court should be reluctant to turn away an injured plaintiff. Such a
plaintiff should be denied standing only if the legislator or constitutional
framer clearly did not intend to protect the interest that is claimed to
have been harmed. On the other hand, when the plaintiff has suffered a
nonconcrete injury, the decision is merely whether an intangible and
107. 397 U.S. at 153. The Court in Reservists stated that the Data Processing test
is applicable only in suits under the Administrative Procedure Act and that its use neces-
sitates a concrete injury. See text accompanying notes 95-96 supra. Thus, the standing
guidelines suggested by the author do not reflect an attempt to state a rule approved
of by the Court. They simply draw on one aspect of a rule that the Court formulated
but proceeded to use in a limited area.
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indirect effect on the plaintiff should be considered an injury at all. The
latter determination requires greater care in order to select proper
plaintiffs, and, thus, a much closer reading of the provision is appropri-
ate.
Since effective standing rules should contain the "arguably within
the zone of interests" test and should include both types of injuries
mentioned above, proper criteria for standing should include the follow-
ing: Plaintiff must allege either (1) a concrete injury that is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional provision alleged to be violated, or (2) an injury of the
type contemplated by the statute or constitutional provision alleged to be
violated.
The suggested rule would have allowed standing in Reservists. As
indicated earlier, the injury to the plaintiff, although it was not concrete,
was of the type anticipated by the incompatibility clause. Thus, the
plaintiff in Reservists would meet the second alternative.
The first alternative in the suggested rule would allow standing in
the usual case. For example, if a woman sues, complaining that she is
being denied a job solely because of her sex in violation of the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, she would have stand-
ing. She is suffering a concrete economic injury, and the interest in
being free from discrimination in hiring is arguably within the zone of
interests to be protected by the equal protection clause.
The rule for determining standing need not be any different when
the plaintiff is asserting standing based on his interest as a taxpayer. The
fact that the plaintiff is a taxpayer is simply a factor in determining
whether or not the statute or constitutional provision is designed to
protect against the injury that plaintiff alleges. For example, the consti-
tutional provision relied on in Richardson, in its requirement that gov-
ernment expenditures be reported, is directed more toward protecting
the interests of taxpayers than toward securing the interests of other
citizens. The purposes for which the provision was drafted probably
included letting taxpayers know how their money is spent and prevent-
ing unauthorized secret expenditures.' 8 Thus, a taxpayer who is upset
because he does not know how his money is being spent has suffered an
injury anticipated by the provision and sufficient for standing, even if it
is not concrete.
Injury to the Plaintiff
The rules for standing suggested above should also require that
there be an injury to the plaintiff, as opposed to an injury to anyone. 0 9
108. 418 U.S. at 198-201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
109. Of course, a statute could provide that a sufficient injury to the plaintiff is
his concern for others. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
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Filling this criterion is usually deemed necessary for satisfaction of the
case or controversy requirement." 0 In order to insure an adversary
presentation of the issues, it is necessary to have a plaintiff who is
motivated by an injury or a threat of injury to himself. Some commenta-
tors, including Professor Raoul Berger,"' have argued that the case or
controversy requirement does not include the idea of standing at all and
that thus there need not be an injury to the plaintiff for standing. By
analyzing the state of American and English law at the time that the
Constitution was written, Professor Berger concluded that courts have
been incorrect in including standing in the case or controversy require-
ment. He determined that English practice in the eighteenth century
encouraged suits by "strangers to attack unauthorized action."" 2 Berger
indicated that there may be policy reasons for requiring a personal
interest on the part of the plaintiff but that such interest should not be
thought of as mandated by the Constutition. Berger admitted, however,
that his evidence was scanty." 3 At any rate, a majority of the Supreme
Court today views injury in fact to the plaintiff as a constitutional
prerequisite for standing.
Even if the requirement of an injury to the plaintiff were not
mandated by the constitution, there are policy considerations which
support such a rule. This requirement serves the function of screening
certain cases from the federal court. In his concurring opinion in Rich-
ardson, Justice Powell offered the customary reasons for the importance
of such a screening device: 1 4 the need to conserve judicial resources and
the necessity of preventing expansion of the Court's authority in a way
that would upset the balance of powers among the three branches of
government. It does seem clear that the courts should not be a forum for
anyone who disputes any government practice for any reason. Since
presumably some cases do have to be rejected, a requirement that the
plaintiff himself must have suffered an injury before he can sue is logical
because such a rule would generally work to reject less deserving
plaintiffs in favor of more deserving ones. Also, as long as someone is
hurt by the challenged practice, a suit can be brought as soon as a
willing injured plaintiff is located. Moreover, as Professor Kenneth
Davis points out, drawing the line between a plaintiff with an injury
which might be very slight and a plaintiff with no injury to himself is
distinguishing "the difference between something and nothing [and]
[tihat is a natural place to draw the line . .. .,,1
110. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1971).
111. Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Require-
ment?, 78 YALE L. J. 816 (1969).
112. Id. at 827 (emphasis omitted).
113. Id.
114. 418 U.S. at 188-92.
115. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. Rav. 601, 614
(1968).
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Thus, any standing rules should provide for the same result
reached in Sierra Club." 6 A plaintiff cannot sue on behalf of a segment
of the public that is threatened with harm unless the plaintiff belongs to
that segment.
Conclusion
The current standing rules seem inadequate because they often
preclude challenges to violations of statutes and constitutional provisions
which are designed to protect citizens from intangible, but real, injuries.
This problem could be avoided if standing criteria for all situations were
developed by applying the reasoning in Data Processing and the district
court decision in Reservists. Guided by these opinions and a general
concern for equitable administration of the law, the following rule for
standing might be developed. Standing exists when the plaintiff alleges
an injury to himself that is either: (1) a concrete injury that is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional provision alleged to be violated, or (2) an injury of
the type contemplated by the provision in question. This rule would
prevent suits initiated by those whom the authors of statutes and consti-
tutional provisions did not anticipate, yet it would allow all the suits
necessary to give such provisions their proper force.
Nicholas L. Lucich, Jr.*
116. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1971).
* Member, Third Year Class.
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